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Introduction: Setting the Stage
”It took a hundred years for us to even get to the point where we could start talking about and
implementing a law to make sure everybody got health insurance. And my pledge to the American
people is, is that we're going to solve the problems that are there, we're going to get it right, and
the Affordable Care Act is going to work for the American people.” –President Barack Obama

On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (the “Affordable Care Act,” or “ACA”), which has altered the health care
landscape in the United States. The implementation of the ACA has been a roller coaster: a
Supreme Court decision, a government shutdown, and a continuing battle over whether it will
lead to better health or disaster for this country. The focal point of the ACA was increasing both
the quality and affordability of health insurance for citizens or lawfully present people – a
“coverage first” strategy for overarching health care reform. The Act combined an individual
mandate with subsidies to boost affordability, and included health insurance exchanges to foster
coverage options. Health insurance exchanges are marketplaces where individuals and
businesses can shop for and buy health insurance (National Association of Insurance
Commissioners, 2011, 1). These marketplaces are web portals that consumers can visit to get
informed and compare their insurance plan options. Health plan options are checked and
certified to comply with federal, and sometimes more stringent, state standards for coverage and
price. However, individuals do not have to purchase through the exchanges; the private
insurance market remains as an option for buying coverage.
The health insurance exchanges are the vehicle driving the ACA reform – the front line
and contact point to residents of the United States. When the law was designed, federal
policymakers incorrectly assumed that most states would create their own state-run health
exchanges (Scotti, 2013). In fact, more than half ended up using the option written within the
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law that allowed them to have the federal government run and operate an exchange for their
state. A handful also ended up partnering with the federal government – leaving only seventeen
states establishing their own design (“State Decisions For Creating Health Insurance
Marketplaces,” 2014). This decision alone vastly differentiated the implementation pathways of
states, and resulted in tremendously different outcomes for residents depending on what state
they live in. The federal exchange, HealthCare.gov, had disastrous problems including an utter
failure in its launch on October 1, 2013. Many states have had technology breakdowns and
abysmal enrollment numbers; such as Maryland who was still only accepting paper applications
at the end of the first enrollment period, or Oklahoma whose enrollment percentage stands at
4.5% of the eligible population after the first enrollment period (Speights, 2014). By
comparison, Connecticut’s percentage is approximately 30% (Speights, 2014). Many states are
struggling in a similar position to Oklahoma and Maryland, while others like Connecticut have
soared and experienced relative success. The question is, why?

Argument
This thesis will focus on the implementation of a state-designed health insurance
exchange in Connecticut, called Access Health CT. The first round of enrollment for residents,
which ran from October 1, 2013 until March 31, 2014, is now complete. State and federal
officials have publicly stated that Connecticut is a leader in ACA health insurance exchange
implementation. As of April 1, 2014, Access Health CT had signed up 208,301 people, or
approximately 30% of its eligible population (Whipple, 2014). By comparison, Hawaii’s statedesigned exchange enrolled just 3.2% of those eligible, and Oklahoma’s federally-facilitated
exchange enrolled 4.5% (Speights, 2014). Connecticut has also been praised for its functional
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and fast technology and system, as well as a high satisfaction rate among enrollees (Whipple,
2014).
This thesis will argue that political focus on and support for health reform, as well as an
existing health policy infrastructure within Connecticut, enabled the state to enjoy early success
with ACA exchange implementation. Political willingness backed by a network of advocates
and experts drove Connecticut to the front of the pack and led to many smart structural design
and implementation choices. However, even a triumph in the first sprint does not mean a victory
for the marathon that is the ACA’s implementation. Connecticut still has to fix problems that
have plagued its past efforts for health reform. The two most prevalent issues include cost, with
regards to health care services and affordability for consumers, as well as ensuring a solid health
care system within the state to back up the large influx of newly insured individuals.

Theoretical Background
The ACA employs cooperative federalism: two levels of government, federal and state,
working together to implement policy. There is a particular set of literature that applies to policy
implementation and federalism. Numerous scholars have concurred that specific requirements,
such as the willingness of each level to work together and structural capacity, are essential for
implementation to succeed. McLaughlin (1987) describes the difficulty of making policy
changes happen, particularly across layers of government and multiple institutions (172). He
boils policy success down to two key ingredients: local capacity and will. Capacity, he says, can
be difficult, but it is possible to build over time (172). Will, on the other hand, cannot be altered
so easily and is a necessary foundation for successful policy change. Particularly with a mandate
from the federal government, policymakers cannot dictate what matters to a specific state (172).
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Also recognized by scholars is the fluidity of implementation – the idea that implementation
problems are never “solved,” (Majone and Wildavsky, 1977). Implementation evolves through a
multistaged, iterative process. A balance of pressure and support on decision-makers from
advocacy groups throughout the process is essential to focus and enable implementation.
O’Toole and Montjoy (1984) build on this, adding that when two or more agencies or
levels of government are coordinating to implement a policy, productive relations between the
two are imperative, particularly when there is mandated cooperation (494). This parallels
Thompson’s (1986) argument that examines the commitment, capacity, and progressivity of
states with regards to health care policy. Thompson focuses on a gap of political will and
administrative capacity between many states and Washington, D.C. Years before the ACA was
even passed, concerns were raised about having such substantial variation among the states with
respect to their views on health care reform.
The ACA challenges the federalist roots of the United States described by these policy
implementation scholars. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) can draft regulations and issue
guidance for health reform, but the states have the power to truly make them work. Jost (2010)
predicted that the wide variety of choices would create unique exchange models within each
state, allowing opportunities for experimentation, comparison, and learning (22). That is
precisely what has happened. No state has made the exact same implementation decisions.
With respect to health policy reform, a subsection of implementation scholars have
suggested specific tactics and mechanisms to support state-level implementation. Many have
pointed to the importance of advocacy efforts within states. While the depth and breadth of the
advocacy community will inevitably differ from one state to another, developing the capacity of
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existing state organizations has been identified as imperative for implementation success
(McLaughlin, 1987). Advocacy groups are seen to be important for tasks such as analyzing
policy options, conducting legal analysis, building coalitions, developing communication efforts,
monitoring, and providing feedback on implementation efforts (Dash, 2013, 8). The California
Endowment (2011) emphasizes the need for these advocacy groups to create a consumer
implementation “table” that brings together organizations working on implementation, such as
health care and low-income advocacy groups, state fiscal policy groups, and children advocacy
organizations (5). Also discussed is the need for relationships with the elected, appointed, and
career state officials in order to have access to the leaders who are influential in driving
implementation efforts. As the implementation literature suggests, political will and capacity
in the form of advocacy networks proved key to CT’s successful health care exchange.

Methods
When implementing the ACA, each state made choices that drove it closer or further
from the ideal structures established by the scholars above. Assessing these choices enables us
to single out Connecticut and make conclusions as to how those choices have affected the level
of success. To do so, I conducted a complete overview of the health insurance exchange
implementation literature. This review led to a distinct group of principal decisions necessary
for formulating an exchange. To determine the breakdown of structural choices in Connecticut, I
examined publications by multiple foundations and organizations within the state. Further, I
reviewed agendas, minutes and presentations from Exchange Board meetings. To assess how
these decisions were made and why, I interviewed seven key actors in Connecticut’s Exchange
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implementation. Drawing on connections from professors and relatives, I purposively identified
initial informants across the range of key actors associated with health insurance exchanges.
These key roles included consumer and small business advocates, officials working at the
Exchange itself, a media representative, and an insurance policy analyst. Additional informants
were reached using a snowball procedure, where an informant would recommend a particular
individual who he or she believed would be insightful. Drawing on a semi-structured interview
guide, interviews asked informants their opinion on certain decisions made by the Board, their
own opinion on successes and failures of the Exchange, as well as a few specific questions
related to their area of expertise. Their answers were collected and organized to find patterns of
opinions, as well as any contradicting viewpoints. A few informants received follow-up emails
to clarify their statements and probe their reasoning if their comments disagreed with something
stated in another interview. Interviews were also used to get a better perspective of the groundlevel implementation, including the unique nuances of Connecticut’s policy infrastructure that
framed the choices that were made within the state.

The Path Ahead
Using this strategy, I have pieced together an in-depth case study of Connecticut’s health
insurance exchange implementation that reflects on the past and projects to the future. The first
chapter of this thesis will explore the past: a health reform that Massachusetts started in 2006 and
was a model for the ACA. The impact of comparable decisions made by Massachusetts’s
policymakers shapes predictions of how implementation in Connecticut will play out. While
Massachusetts’s reform was a model for the ACA, it was not an exact replica. Chapter two will
outline the different options states had during the implementation of the ACA exchanges, and
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will demonstrate the wide spectrum of alternatives. These options are the forks, decisions where
Connecticut branched off from other states’ decisions and paved their unique pathway of
implementation. Lastly, chapter three will focus on the specific pathway of Connecticut’s
implementation, giving a detailed breakdown of the process. Most importantly, I will draw
conclusions as to whether Connecticut has truly succeeded in exchange implementation as the
media has portrayed. Success in Connecticut will be attributed to two overarching elements: a
strong history of health reform that fostered a policy infrastructure and advocacy networks,
coupled with political will. It will become clear that these two factors facilitated a number of
important structural choices made by Connecticut policymakers – the sequence of choices that
has allowed Connecticut to be seen as one of the nation’s leaders in ACA implementation.
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The 2006 Health Reform in Massachusetts:
Takeaways From a State-Level Model for the ACA
“A group of people across the state that is larger than the entire population of the city of Boston,
which used to not have insurance, that group now has health insurance. It worked in
Massachusetts.” – Jonathan Gruber, Professor of Economics at MIT

Before health reform was a top priority on the national agenda, Massachusetts’s
policymakers were designing their own comprehensive state reform in April of 2006. The
coverage and insurance market reform provisions of the ACA were modeled after those
implemented in Massachusetts. Because of its comparability to the ACA, the experiences of
Massachusetts offer lessons, expectations, and possible consequences of certain provisions of the
ACA. Even when the ACA was first passed in March 2010, the Bay State already had four years
of knowledge and experience with a similar law that policymakers continue to study to predict
the ACA’s impacts.
That said, the 2006 reform in Massachusetts was not identical to the ACA.
Massachusetts has different demographics than other states where the ACA applies, and a few
specifics, such as the insurance subsidies offered to low-income families, were different in its
reform (Gruber, 2013, 185). However, its basic structure can be used to gather a picture of what
life might look like in the ACA’s future. Considering Connecticut and Massachusetts’s
similarities in political climate, population, and uninsured rates pre-reform, it is wise of
Connecticut policymakers to pay close attention to outcomes in Massachusetts, and to hopefully
learn valuable lessons from their successes and setbacks.
This chapter will first report the structural and implementation choices made by
Massachusetts’s legislators. These will include decisions regarding decision-making bodies, the
plans and subsidies established for consumers, and the actions taken to increase awareness and
public support for the reform. The efficacy of these decisions will be assessed based on whether
11

they successfully lowered the uninsured rate and increased access to health care, while
minimizing negative concerns such as cost and long-term sustainability. Most importantly, the
applicable lessons from Massachusetts for Connecticut’s implementation of the ACA will be
highlighted. Perhaps most valuable will be exploring the changes that Massachusetts’s
policymakers made once certain problems arose with implementation. As a “learning
organization,” the Massachusetts Exchange was able to use a cycle of feedback to make the
changes needed to further its health care goals. However, despite the success of some of these
adaptations, cost and difficulties reaching the remaining uninsured population have continued to
afflict the Massachusetts Exchange today. The totality of initial snags, modifications made, as
well as the lasting problems will all be necessary for Connecticut to understand if they are to
successfully implement a health insurance exchange.

An Act Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care
Health reform was a top priority on the Massachusetts agenda back in 2006. Many
proposals were suggested and altered. Although legislators disagreed on the specifics of how to
reach their goals, most agreed on some basic objectives they wanted to achieve. These included
near-universal health insurance coverage, and improved access to affordable, high-quality health
care that included shared responsibility between individuals, employers, and the government
(Holahan and Blumberg 2006, 436). All of these were predicted to be beneficial for improving
the health status and overall welfare of state residents.
Massachusetts’s legislation, like the ACA, set up a health insurance exchange for the
purchase of non-group coverage, established a program to subsidize insurance for lower-income
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families, and mandated that all adult residents purchase what is deemed affordable health
insurance (Holtz-Eakin, 2011, 178).

Policymaker Goals
The overarching, long-term goal for the Massachusetts health reform improved health
care for its citizens. However, to do so, the state set objectives specifically to measure success of
the Act’s implementation. First and foremost, Massachusetts aimed to reduce the rate of
uninsured people in the state to achieve the goal of near-universal coverage. But in order to link
increased coverage with further extended health care success, other goals had to be addressed as
well. The second goal was to improve access to affordable, high-quality health care. Improved
access could be demonstrated in the average number of doctor visits and resident-reported
satisfaction levels. High quality could also be a self-reported satisfaction level and perhaps the
number of specialty care visits. Finally, policymakers also wanted to ensure a sense of shared
responsibility between individuals, employers, and the government.
Massachusetts’s policymakers knew that focusing so much effort on getting people health
insurance was not going to be possible forever. In fact, they knew that this was just the first step
in improving overall health care for residents. They made the decision to channel a lot of energy
into getting people health insurance, and determined they would make adjustments later. To do
so, the Exchange defined itself as a “learning organization,” where they constantly reconsidered
and revised their policies based on the experience of consumers, carriers, and employers
(Kingsdale, 2009, 592). This feedback mechanism would address health care problems as they
arose throughout the reform.
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Structure and Implementation Decisions
The health insurance exchange for the state was named the Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector, or “the Connector.” This was established as a quasi-independent state
agency with ten senior staff members and approximately fifty employees (Lischko, Bachman &
Vangeli, 2009, 2). An eleven-member Board of Directors governed the Connector. The Board
included representatives from business, labor and consumer backgrounds, as well as content
experts (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 2). The Board and the Connector worked together on
determining the interworking of the marketplace. For example, the Board set the minimum
creditable coverage (MCC) standards, mandated an individual mandate, and defined an
“affordable premium,” (McDonough et al., 2008). However, the Connector defined the
boundaries of that mandate and decided the precise numbers and insurance plans that would fit
the outlines decided by the Board. Many decisions were a cooperative effort between the two.
The Connector also approved the sliding scales of subsidized health coverage provided by the
state, as well as non-subsidized insurance that meets certain coverage and cost standards
(Kingsdale, 2009, 591). Basically, the Connector has the power to decide what category of
insurance residents fall into, and how much each of those categories will pay.
Another job of the Connector was making sure awareness and public support were
widespread. Enrollment in the subsidized and non-subsidized programs required an “active
response” by residents. If the uninsured were confused about coverage or too anxious about the
financial commitment, the policy was not going to succeed (SOURCE? 590). In addition to
residents, employer-backing is consistently a huge issue for health reforms. In Massachusetts,
business groups had blocked prior legislation, so it was imperative that they “buy in” to the rules
of the new policy.
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To do so, Massachusetts’s legislators and policymakers ran a campaign. The process
included many public events. The law was signed in historic Faneuil Hall, with political leaders,
advocacy groups, business executives and the public all in attendance (SOURCE? 590). Other
milestone celebrations were held at the State House, community health centers, the Kennedy
Presidential Library, Harvard University, and the University of Massachusetts. Even the Boston
Red Sox baseball team was on board, with events held at Fenway Park (Raymond, 2011, 15).
Publicity created by these events was also important when spreading the word for a new
coverage option launch.
The state also funded community outreach efforts, a public information office, hundreds
of educational meetings, and advertising (Kingsdale, 2009, 590). Legislators made sure their
communities knew about the program. Politicians used radio, television, social media, signs at
grocery stores, fliers at the Department of Motor Vehicles, postcards, and even ads on subways
and busses (Raymond, 2011, 15). Not only did they make sure residents were aware, but they
were constantly reaching out for suggestions and educating citizens about their options. This
engagement was used to justify the burdens of shared responsibility and make sure the
population was informed. Although what individuals, employers, and the government were
taking on with this reform may have seemed daunting, the idea that it was a collective effort
lessened this load. This collective spirit was reflected in this statistics of public support: more
than two-thirds of likely voters supported the legislation even a few years after the reform was
initiated (Kingsdale, 2009, 591).

Evaluation of Outcomes: What Went Right
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When evaluating the outcomes of the Massachusetts health reform, we seek to compare
the results under reform to the results that would have occurred in the absence of reform.
Fortunately, many foundations sponsored research that provided baseline data on coverage,
access to needed care, racial and ethnic disparities, as well as the effect of the health reform on
the state’s population over time. All of this information and data is key for determining the
success of implementation.
An overwhelming majority of sources share common statistics and determinations
regarding the health reform in Massachusetts. Long (2008) conducted a survey of 10,000
respondents over a 3-year time period (272). The surveys collected information on insurance
status, access to care, out-of-pocket spending, medical debt, and more general financial
problems. The report compares outcomes for a cross-sectional sample of adults in periods
following the implementation of health reform to the outcomes for a similar cross-sectional
sample of adults prior to the reform (Long and Masi, 2009, 579).
In terms of lowering the uninsured rate the data shows that after implementation of the
2006 health reform, uninsurance is at historically low levels. These findings were again verified
by annual studies; in 2011, the uninsurance rate in Massachusetts was 3.9 percent, while the
national average was 15.1 percent (Long, Goin, and Lynch, 2013, 2).
With respect to the goal of increasing access to health care, there have been
improvements in access for working-age adults. Adults are more likely to have a primary source
of care, doctor visits, preventative care visits, and dental care visits than before the reform.
Working-age adults were more likely to report that they had a usual place to go when sick or in
need of advice about their health, which indicates a continuity of care in the system (Long and
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Masi, 2009, 580). All of these positive gains reflect increases in both insurance coverage and in
the enhancements of existing coverage.
Another goal established by policymakers was to ensure shared responsibility between
individuals, employers, and the government. This was achieved when many implementers
focused on strong coordination between all levels, from policymakers to ground-level workers.
For example, the Secretary of Health and Human Services held weekly meetings with leaders
across the state to share information and report progress and challenges (Raymond, 2011, 8).
This communication led to an effective collaboration between multiple agencies working on the
policy. Legislators were sure to start the program with mostly existing programs to maintain
continuity during initial implementation. The Health and Human Services Department in
Massachusetts worked with the Connector on joint training sessions, and the Connector also
worked with the Division of Insurance to design certain policies(SOURCE 8). This coordination
was so important because it reduced redundancy and administrative costs. Coordination also
contributed to a smoother transition for people switching to a different type of coverage. Other
strategic decisions were designing a common application and placing people automatically in the
program they qualify for (10). This alleviated the need for residents to understand any
unnecessary, complicated details.
While Massachusetts exceled in furthering its health care goals, not every aspect of the
proposal worked smoothly from the beginning. As expected when the state defined itself as a
“learning organization,” the Connector had to tweak its plan a bit for the reform to reach its full
potential.

Evaluation of Outcomes: What Needed to Be Fixed
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With all of these successes, any policymaker has to keep sustainability in mind. For the
Massachusetts health reform, there were some difficulties. For example, there were indications
that some adults were having a more difficult time obtaining care in the fall of 2008 than in fall
of 2007. Although this may reflect many factors, its likely that the influx of newly insured adults
combined with those now having additionally covered benefits created an increased demand for
follow-up care that was not anticipated or prepared for by the medical providers (Kaiser Family
Foundation, 2012, 5).
Another issue was the fact that one in five adults reported being told the doctor’s office
was not accepting patients with their type of coverage or was not accepting any new patients
(Andrews, 2014). These difficulties were more common for lower-income individuals with
public coverage than for higher-income adults with private insurance. This could be the result of
lower reimbursements to providers from public versus the private programs.
Risk selection and free riding has been difficult for Massachusetts because of the
“coverage first” strategy – similar to the ACA. Generally speaking, people are incentivized to
take on coverage when they have expensive medical care costs, then drop coverage after
treatment. Big picture, this means insurance companies are taking on costs for all these costly
procedures, but there are not enough healthy people to balance out the costs of paying for that
treatment. A study by the main insurance provider for the Connector, Blue Cross Blue Shield,
demonstrated that there was a large portion of the population that would sign up for coverage for
three months or less, undertake medical spending four times the average, then drop coverage
soon after (Holtz-Eakin, 2011, 179).
Affordability is another significant concern for policymakers. Per capita health spending
in the state is 15% higher than the national average (Kingsdale, 2009, 589). During the first year

18

of reform, the financial burden of health care on individuals dropped significantly. But slowly
the gains trailed off. This led to increases in unmet need for care because of costs over that
period. There was also difficulty finding providers and getting timely appointments (Long and
Masi, 2009, 585). Thus, the growing health care costs were jeopardizing affordability and
affecting the successes of the entire health reform.

Addressing The Issues: Response by Legislators & Policymakers
The strong communication channels opened by policymakers enabled them to be fully
aware of the problems discussed above. As a “learning organization,” the Connector took a
number of initiatives to address these issues. The structural set-up of the reform allowed for a
constant evolution of policy.
For example, to increase provider capacity, they started primary care physician
recruitment programs. These expanded medical school enrollments for students committed to
primary care, and even started a program that repaid loans for medical students who agreed to
practice in underserved areas (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 6). When applications were
coming in too fast for workers to process them, the Connector adopted enrollment simplifications
and made greater use of technology (Raymond, 2011, 12). Additional health reform legislation
was also passed in 2008 to initiate cost containment and delivery system improvements. It
included new regulations for electronic medical records by 2015 and a uniform billing and
coding procedure among health care providers and insurers (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 7).
Furthermore, legislators have noticed other issues and enacted solutions; they have banned gifts
to physicians from pharmaceutical companies and implemented a program that educates
providers on the cost-effective utilization of prescription drugs (7). Taking this a step further,
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providers are encouraged to investigate cost themselves and make recommendations to reduce
excess expenses during annual public hearings.
Sticking with the strategy of listening to the front line, the legislature also created a
Special Commission on the Health Care Payment System. This Commission released
recommendations in 2009 suggesting a transparent payment methodology that made significant
changes to the system (7). New legislation was passed based on these recommendations, and
introduced in May of 2012. All of these adaptions prove that the policy and structure in place for
the health reform in Massachusetts was flexible in a way that made successful implementation a
much more likely outcome.
When legislators in Massachusetts made the decisions to start with an individual mandate
and focus on universal coverage, they knew that this would mean adjustments. The Connector’s
persistent acknowledgment of areas for improvement has been a significant reason for its
success. But no matter how successful a policy, it cannot be perfect. This next section will
address long-term problems that the Connector has faced, despite changes made by legislators.

Remaining Issues: Long-Term Problems Connecticut Should Understand
Massachusetts has been heavily criticized during the more recent implementation of the
ACA due to its “largely non-functional exchange website” (Archambault, 2014). This website,
however, is completely different from the website used for the original 2006 health reform due to
certain requirements from the federal government. These changes include incorporating an
exchange for small businesses, connecting technology to federal databases, and adjusting
subsidies and plan designs to ensure they are conforming to federal standards (Gruber, 2013,

20

185). Setting aside the well-known struggle with technology, there are also a few long-term
problems of the Connector that Connecticut should actively try to combat.

Cost Containment
The cost of health care in Massachusetts was the highest in the country before reform law
was passed – and remains so as of 2013 (Vestal, 2013). The Connector emphasized that its main
focus in the original phases of implementation would be on lowering the uninsured rate. Rising
costs quickly became an apparent problem that needed to be addressed. Cost of health care is a
double-edged sword: (a) prices of services are rising, which means (b) corresponding premiums
and deductibles paid by consumers are raised accordingly. Many people in the Massachusetts
health care industry are worried that this “death spiral” will unravel the state’s nearly universal
health care coverage, bankrupt businesses, and have severely detrimental effects on the state’s
budget (Vestal, 2013).
Rising health care costs are not unique to Massachusetts. While they are proportionally
higher in the Bay State, nationwide health care costs per person are higher in the United States
than in any other country in the world (Holtz-Eakin et al., 2011, 180). In August 2013,
Massachusetts passed Chapter 224 designating a budget for the health care industry in the
Commonwealth. The central idea behind the law is price transparency – to require all of the
state’s insurers and health care providers to provide to the public the prices of the services they
offer (Vestal, 2013). The hope is that this will arm consumers to make informed choices about
their care, forcing providers to respond to this competitive pressure by offering cheaper services.
Quality, however, is thought to be controlled by consumer pressure; therefore providers would
have incentives to deliver less expensive care by becoming more efficient (Vestal, 2013).
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Governor Deval Patrick said of the law, “I’m confident that just as we showed the nation how to
deliver universal care, Massachusetts will be the place that cracks the code on cost containment,”
(Vestal, 2013).
The effects of Chapter 224 will not be seen for many years. Cost of health care will
continue to be a battle for Massachusetts. Skeptics of the new law question its enforceability. If
the industry does not limit annual growth to the state’s designated regulations, will providers be
issued penalties; will they be shut down? Many worry that providers are not working with a
margin that is attainable for them to contain, therefore the law will “have no teeth” when it
comes to enforcement (Vestal, 2013).

Reaching the Remaining Uninsured Population
In addition to cost containment, similar issues continue with reaching the remaining
uninsured population. According to the Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid,
the average state health uninsurance rate is 15%. The highest uninsured rate is Nevada at 23%.
The lowest is Massachusetts, where only 4% of the population remains without health insurance
(Kaiser Commission on Medicaid 2013). However, this means that some residents of the state
continue to go without health insurance coverage. These remaining uninsured are
disproportionately younger, male, Hispanic, and non-citizens (Long, Goin, and Lynch, 2013, 1).
The $20 million statewide outreach and awareness campaign discussed was not successful in
signing up this portion of the population. As seen in Figure 1, the relatively high uninsurance for
non-elderly adults (8 percent or more) in the state in 2010 was concentrated in the Greater
Boston area and in pockets across the state, including areas around Lowell and Springfield and in
the southeastern part of the state.
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Figure 1: Uninsurance Rates for Non-Elderly Adults and Children Across Communities in
Massachusetts, 2010
Source: Blue Cross Blue Shield 2013, page 25
Not all of those uninsured are eligible for coverage options, particularly due to new
provisions implemented from the ACA. Undocumented immigrants are ineligible for Medicaid.
Literacy, language and culture issues among the uninsured also were not addressed satisfactorily.
Maxwell et al. (2011) corroborates that Hispanics are more likely than any other racial or ethnic
group in the United States to lack health insurance. New outreach strategies are being employed
to target the communities with the largest numbers of uninsured individuals, especially those
lacking connections to the health care system. Additional changes include simplified enrollment
processes and extended assistance for finding providers within the health care system (Maxwell
et al., 2011). The lesson to be learned from Massachusetts in this area is that in initial outreach
efforts, the younger, male, Hispanic populations will be more difficult to inform.
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Concluding Remarks
The Massachusetts health reform has provided us with a valuable example of what ACA
implementation might be like. This chapter outlined the pathway that Massachusetts took and
drew out both successes and failures. Having this model to analyze can be beneficial to
Connecticut – both to replicate the Commonwealth’s successes and to avoid its mistakes.
As would be expected from a state-initiated reform, it has been clear throughout this
chapter that political support in Massachusetts was imperative to its success. Proper funding and
manpower to carry out implementation efforts such as outreach and plan design was crucial.
Clear goals, a varied group of knowledgeable representatives on the Board, and cooperation
between involved agencies also helped Massachusetts succeed in moving towards universal
health insurance coverage. These decisions made possible a commendable outreach campaign
that has successfully signed up enough citizens that Massachusetts now has the lowest uninsured
rate of any state. Research has shown that this coverage has opened the door for many residents
of Massachusetts, allowing them access to health care that was unattainable before the reform.
Additionally, a significant quality of the exchange in Massachusetts was its own
definition of itself as a “learning organization.” Policymakers and legislators have consistently
been open to making modifications based on funneled feedback from ground-level workers,
consumers, and researchers. A perfect example of this was mentioned when the shortage of
providers problem started. The learning organization heard the struggles and made a number of
changes to combat them, even starting a program that repaid loans for medical students who
agreed to practice in underserved areas. This cyclical reform process supported the
Massachusetts reform and has been a large component of its continued success.
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In conjunction with these positive takeaways, Massachusetts has also illustrated a few
long-term problems of concern. This chapter has demonstrated that both the containment of
health care costs and bringing in the hardest to reach uninsured populations have been difficult
for Massachusetts. These are issues that all those implementing exchanges through the ACA
should be aware of so they can actively attempt to combat these problems.
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ACA Pathways: Structural and Implementation Options for States
“States must make complex decisions about how to design their exchanges in ways that reflect the
unique needs of their consumers and insurance market. [These decisions] affect key outcomes,
such as enrollment, cost, consumer experience, and sustainability.” – Sarah Dash, Kevin W.
Lucia, Katie Keith, and Christine Monahan, Georgetown University

The ACA directs states to establish health insurance marketplaces, or exchanges, to
facilitate purchasing by both individuals and employers. In contrast to the Act’s other provisions
such as broader reforms for the private insurance market and Medicaid expansion, the
implementation of the exchanges rests heavily on the efforts of the states. Similar to
Massachusetts in its 2006 health reform, states have made decisions regarding structure,
governance, operations, and how to ensure a seamless, quality experience for their future
consumers – citizens. This chapter will outline the different options states faced when
implementing exchanges. Since no two states followed the exact same pathway, each can be
seen as its own “state experiment” of the ACA. Although in-depth comparisons between states
regarding these decisions will take years and numerous rounds of data collection, it is important
to outline the differences now to formulate predictions regarding what decisions are principal to
success.

The Big One: What Type of Exchange
The first decision states made shaped the entirety of their ACA implementation. Their
options were (a) to design their own state exchange, (b) to partner with the federal
government or (c) to defer to the federal government to set up an exchange for them.
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The ACA passed through Congress without a single vote from a Republican
representative. For most of its provisions, the lack of Republican support was immaterial
because the new policies were to be implemented nationwide. For the exchanges, however, the
lack of Republican support caused problems. The bill that ended up passing through Congress
required states to “opt-in” to exchanges. This “opt-in” meant administering the law themselves,
and the alternative was turning responsibility over to the federal government. To design their
own exchanges, states had to put in active effort that indicated the state was making progress on
implementation. States with political environments opposed to the ACA typically did not take
action to show compliance with a law they did not want to pass in the first place. But this
inaction meant they deferred to a federally-facilitated exchange that the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services would set up for them.
Twenty-seven states defaulted to the federally operated exchange option as an intentional
snub to the Act, while others did not feel they had the capacity to operate an exchange
themselves. In Texas, Governor Rick Perry, a Republican, announced that Texas would not
create a state exchange because it would not result in better “patient protection” or in more
“affordable care” (ThinkProgress, 2012). As a result, Texas is served by the federal government
exchange. In Maine, public officials made the decision that they could not establish their own
exchange due to fiscal constraints of the state. Thus, they too relied heavily on the federal
government to set up their exchange. However, unlike Texas, Maine’s proposal letter to the
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services stated, “the State of Maine is open to exploring
options for coordination as described in your proposal” (State of Maine Bureau of Insurance,
2013). An additional seven states opted for a Partnership exchange, a hybrid model where the
state and federal governments work together.
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The remaining sixteen states, and the District of Columbia, chose to establish an
Exchange themselves (CCIIO, 2013). Requesting permission from the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to establish a state-run exchange was a bit like
applying to college. In Connecticut, Governor Dannel Malloy sent a letter to Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius on July 10, 2012. The deadline for submission was December 14, 2012. Governor
Malloy had to update Sebelius on the CT Exchange: what the structure, board and plans were for
the future. The Governor’s letter ended with, “On behalf of everyone involved in the Exchange,
we look forward to working with your office to realize the goals of the ACA and to develop an
Exchange by 2014 that meets the unique market and coverage needs here in Connecticut”
(Malloy, 2012). The CT Exchange workers received a response from Secretary Sebelius on
December 7, 2012. She congratulated Governor Malloy and informed him that the state had
received conditional approval to establish a state-based exchange. These conditions included
being able to perform all required Exchange activities projected in the CT Exchange Blueprint
Application, and ongoing compliance with future guidance and regulations (Sebelius, 2012).
With this major milestone out of the way, a whole slew of other decisions came to the
forefront. States all over the country were granted permission to continue working on their
exchanges, and hastily went to work in order to meet the deadlines assigned by Secretary
Sebelius.

Organizational Form
States created structural designs for their exchanges to specify the exchange’s relationship
with the government.
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For the states that decided to establish their own exchanges, they had a few structural
options: assign the tasks of the Exchange to an existing state office, establish a new independent
entity, or create a nonprofit entity (NAIC, 2011, 3). There are benefits and drawbacks to each of
these choices. In particular, there is an important trade-off to weigh when selecting a structure:
accountability versus flexibility. A state agency would have high accountability because it is
made up of elected officials that have to adhere to public scrutiny and retain the threat of not
being re-elected. However, there is a trade-off because this agency would also have less
flexibility due to state administrative and government operation laws. Something as small as the
maximum salary for a civil service job might not be a huge deal until policymakers are trying to
recruit the best talent for the Exchange and the best candidate will not accept such low pay. The
flip side may have more flexibility, but would not have the accountability, mandated
transparency and public participation that a government agency would. A more technical issue
of an Exchange is related to funding. State agencies are subject to political and economic cycles,
which might affect their stability. These nuances had to be considered by states when weighing
the placement of an exchange. These trade-offs are described in the table below.

Table 1: Advantages and Disadvantages of Exchange Structure Types
Type

Advantages
• Direct link to State
administration

State Agency

• Potentially easier
coordination with other State
agencies
• More accountability to actors
involved

Disadvantages
• Politicized decision-making
• Budgetary issues
• Bureaucratic hoops to jump through
• Difficulty hiring and contracting
practices due to procurement rules

• Streamlining
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Independent
Public Entity

Non-Profit
Entity

• Possible exemption from
State personnel and
procurement laws
• More independence from
existing State agencies

• Flexibility in decisionmaking

• Difficult coordinating with key State
agencies (i.e. state Medicaid, insurance
department, etc.)
• Expenses to establish new entity
• Confusion over responsibilities

• Isolation from State policymakers and
key State agency staff
• Potential for decreased accountability

• Less likely for decisions to be • Potential for regulatory duplication,
politicized.
conflict and confusion.
• Expenses to establish new entity

Having weighed these options, states set off on different trajectories in terms of the
structures of their exchanges. Hawaii and Idaho opted to set-up their exchanges as non-profits.
This decision has given the implementers a relaxed reign for making decisions. In Hawaii,
however, some opponents of the non-profit structure have stated that its exemption from the
state’s open meetings law has been detrimental to the transparency and accountability of the
exchange (McCambridge, 2012). Kentucky, New York, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont have
exchanges running within state agencies. In New York, the Exchange is within the Department
of Health and has authority to work in conjunction with the Department of Financial Services to
carry out its responsibilities (Kaiser Family Foundation New York State Marketplace Profile,
2013).
Connecticut was one of twelve states that created a quasi-governmental organization for
its exchange: the Office of Health Reform & Innovation. Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman
headed the statewide approach to federal health reform, and she directed the SustiNet Health
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Care Cabinet to advise the Governor and the Office on issues related to the ACA implementation
(NCSL, 2013). She said of the appointed 14 members of the Board, “We have assembled a wide
variety of experts who I am confident will achieve the goals of the Exchange - expanding access
to affordable, high quality health care coverage while reducing costs.” She explained that as a
quasi-public, the exchange would ensure transparency and accountability while still being nimble
enough to move swiftly like a private-sector company (Stewartson, 2011).
After the first board meeting was delayed in the aftermath of Hurricane Irene, the Cabinet
first met on September 12, 2011 to discuss the role of the office (Connecticut Health Reform
Central, 2011). They established that in order to provide a meaningful and proactive statewide
approach to federal health reform, they needed to establish partnerships, facilitate action plans,
and provide expertise, while respecting the sovereignty of other agencies and partners. Each
cabinet member was assigned a work group in the first meeting – everything from health
technology to business plan development. Connecticut had chosen a structure and officially
started implementation efforts.

Board Composition
States also had to determine who they wanted to be a part of their exchange’s Board – in
other words, who would be best to govern this new body?

The composition of the board is imperative, as these individuals will be determining
policy, voting on the issues, and driving the force of implementation. Among advocates of
health reform, board diversity is seen as essential to achieving good governance and efficiency
(Jost, 2010, 7). A variety of interests, fields of expertise, and political perspectives are
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beneficial. This could mean representatives of other state agencies that the board interacts with
(insurance division, Medicaid agency, etc.); consumers, especially representatives from lowerincome and minority communities; and small businesses.
Although insurers, producers, and providers should be represented, this should be
achieved by avoiding specific conflicts of interest. Health insurers, brokers who sell health
insurance products, and health care providers should be barred from receiving unfair advantages
over competitors or swaying policy decisions to aid their own side concerns (NAIC, 2011, 5).
Avoidance could mean enacting legislation or provisions that would, for instance, prohibit
exchange board members from currently working at or moving directly to or from the insurance
industry (4). This is a delicate balance to achieve; the board must get the politics right and
remain fair, but also ensure that the exchange succeeds and that they are capable of
understanding every aspect of necessary implementation action. Generally, the goal should be a
group of people who can work together to run an exchange, be impartial, and remain committed
to efficient and professional management.
State-run exchange boards range from five to nineteen members. In Maryland,
legislation defines that a seven-member board will govern their Exchange. The Governor
appoints six of those members with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of
Representatives. The last member is ex officio, the Commissioner of Human Services. There
are also rules dictating what groups must be represented on the Board, and limitations on
affiliations of members (Kaiser Family Foundation Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).
The Connecticut board consists of fourteen individuals, including six ex-officio members,
or members that are part of the Board due to their position in another office (such as Benjamin
Barnes from the Office of Policy and Management). On the board are many experts – such as
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Dr. Robert Scalettar in health care delivery systems, and Dr. Robert Tessier, in health care
benefits plan administration (Wyman, 2011). There are two non-voting members, and eight of
the twelve voting members are appointed by elected officials. Table two presents the current
members of the Exchange Board.

Table 2: The Board of Directors of Connecticut’s Health Insurance Exchange as of March 2013
Name

Position

Type

Nancy Wyman –
Chair

Lieutenant Governor

Governor's Appointee

Mary Fox

Retired Senior VP of Aetna Product
Group

Governor's Appointee

Paul Philpott

Principal Consultant, Quo Vadis
Advisors LLC

Legislative Leadership
Appointee

Grant A. Ritter

Senior Scientist, Schneider Institutes
for Health Policy

Legislative Leadership
Appointee

Robert E. Scalettar

Former Chief Medical Officer,
Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield

Legislative Leadership
Appointee

Robert F. Tessier

Executive Director, CT Coalition of
Taft-Hartley Health Funds

Legislative Leadership
Appointee

Cecilia J. Woods

Former Vice-Chair, Permanent
Legislative Leadership
Commission on the Status of Women Appointee

Maura Carley

President and CEO, Healthcare
Navigation, LLC

Legislative Leadership
Appointee

Roderick L. Bremby

Commissioner, Department of Social
Services

Ex-Officio Member (Voting)

Vicki Veltri - CoChair

State Healthcare Advocate, Office of
the Healthcare Advocate

Ex-Officio Member (Voting)
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Benjamin Barnes

Secretary, Office of Policy &
Management

Ex-Officio Member (Voting)

Anne Melissa
Dowling

Deputy Commissioner, Connecticut
Insurance Department

Ex-Officio Member (NonVoting)

Jewel Mullen

Commissioner, Department of Public Ex-Officio Member (NonHealth
Voting)

Commissioner, Department of
Mental Health and Addiction
Services
Source: Connecticut Health Reform Central 2013
Patricia Rehmer,
MSN

Ex-Officio Member (NonVoting)

Connecticut decided that Board members cannot have affiliations with insurers, insurance
producer or brokers, or associations of health care providers, health care facilities or clinics, or
related trades for these entities while serving on the Board. Board Members are also prohibited
from working for a health care carrier that offers a plan through the Exchange for a year after
serving on the Board (Kaiser Family Foundation Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).
Despite these provisions, the Board has a substantial representation of members with ties to the
insurance industry.
Some consumer groups are concerned about the absence of representation for
underinsured or uninsured consumers in Connecticut’s Exchange. In fact, Small Businesses for a
Healthy Connecticut pushed for the removal of retired health insurance executives from the
Board and pushed for more representation of consumers and small businesses. Small Businesses
for a Healthy Connecticut sent a letter to Secretary Sebelius asking for her help "in addressing
the problematic composition of Connecticut's Health Insurance Exchange Board which has overrepresentation by insurance industry interests and under-representation by individual and small
business consumers" (Bordonaro, 2012). Consumer advocates particularly took issue with the
appointment of insurance executive Mary Fox (former senior VP for Aetna Product Group).
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Others, however, disagree and insist the appointments were given to people with real expertise
and “demonstrated concern about and sensitivity to consumer issues and to the needs and desires
of purchasers” (Bordonaro, 2012). Nevertheless, barring any immediate changes to the make-up
of the board, the group that will have the most influence over how Connecticut’s Exchange will
operate is in place.

Regulatory Authority of the Marketplace
Once the board is in place, it must make crucial regulatory decisions about the
functioning of the state health marketplace. The Board has final say on all decisions –
everything from choosing to put a limit on the health plans allowed to be sold through the
exchange, to whether to merge the individual and small employer health insurance markets.
Each state designing its own exchange made its own choices regarding aspects of regulatory
authority of the marketplaces. Two important regulatory considerations when working with
health insurance are adverse selection and the design of certified qualified health plans.

I. Adverse Selection
State exchanges have to face the threat of adverse selection. This phenomenon is when
individuals purchasing insurance through an exchange are categorically unhealthier and incur
high health care costs (Jost, 2010, 3). For example, in Connecticut, the Exchange creates a
market for health insurance and allows people to sign up for certain health insurance plans.
However, there is still the option of purchasing an insurance plan through a company that is not
sold on an exchange. These two groups of people signing up for insurance are called “pools.”
Adverse selection is a potential problem because the pool of people purchasing insurance
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through an exchange can essentially become a “high-risk” pool that becomes destructive to
insurers (SOURCE 3). This natural selection is destructive because if many new customers
buying through an exchange have high medical bills (“high-risk”), insurers then have to drive up
costs to unaffordable levels for all individuals and employers. This would alienate the pool
within the exchange and result in a flood out – everyone looking only to purchase outside the
exchange because of the great cost difference. Fortunately, the ACA does provide some
mechanisms to discourage this phenomenon. First, the individual mandate ensures a larger pool
of individuals, including healthy individuals who otherwise may have stayed out of the insurance
market. Additionally, certain regulations on insurance plans offered through the exchange can
make them more attractive to consumers. “Essential health benefits” also exist within and
outside of the exchanges – such as keeping patient out-of-pocket expenses for medical care the
same for plans purchased within or outside the exchange (NCSL, 2013).
For states, the ACA does not have any provisions in place that prevent them from
actively trying to discourage adverse selection (Jost, 2010, 4). Indeed, unlike the federal
government, states possess unique authority to prohibit the sale of insurance to individuals and
small groups outside the exchange. This measure, however, would be considered an extreme
action to eliminate the outside market and avoid adverse selection. An alternative to this would
be to require plans outside the exchange to comply with regulations imposed within the exchange
(Jost, 2010, 8).
Adverse selection within the exchanges is also a significant risk. If there is a pattern of
preference for high-risk enrollees to pick a particular insurer within the Exchange, that insurance
company is being adversely selected and will likely not continue offering plans through the
Exchange. An option for states to avoid this challenge is to develop a risk-adjustment program.
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These programs move funds from health plans and insurers with lower-actuarial–risk enrollees to
plans and insurers with higher-actuarial-risk enrollees (6). But systems like this require actively
collecting data and the ability to be flexible and responsive to changes within the market. State
exchanges must be sure they have the capacity to take on this task.
California’s Exchange law requires that all plans offered outside the Exchange market
must be offered in the Exchange as well (Cantor, 2012, 11). Connecticut has historically had a
very concentrated, uncompetitive health insurance market. Furthermore, these companies have
enjoyed a low level of regulation by the Connecticut Insurance Department (Andrews, 2014).
This trend continued with the implementation of the ACA. The healthy relationship with
insurance companies that chose not to sell plans through the Exchange was maintained – they
were not prohibited from selling insurance to force consumers to look to the exchange. Instead,
the Board chose to rely on the individual mandate, expecting that the large influx of newly
insured will have a balanced risk pool.

II. Certified Qualified Health Plans
Design and Cost
Linked to adverse selection is the states’ power to control their standards of price and
value within their exchanges. Though there are general federal regulations for what needs to be
included in insurance plans and how much it can cost, states still have a significant amount of
leeway to design these plans. For example, states can approve any and all plans that meet the
ACA’s minimum requirements, or they can set high certification standards that weed out some
carriers’ plans. The ACA does require that all plans within the exchanges be divided into tiers in
order to structure choice and help consumers sort through price and value. But a silver tiered
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plan from Aetna may not be the same as a silver tiered plan from Blue Cross Blue Shield. In
New York, for example, any insurer may participate in the Exchange as long as it offers a plan
on these federally required “metal levels” (typically designated Bronze, Silver, and Gold plan
types). Exchanges can encourage or require insurers to offer just a limited number of options to
encourage competition based on price and value. Exchanges could limit the variability in benefit
design beyond what the federal law requires to limit adverse selection and, if authorized,
negotiate aggressively with health plans on price (The California Endowment, 2011, 41).
Internet tools, quality ratings, and satisfaction surveys can help guide plan selection for
consumers (Jost, 2010, 12). States could also implement a policy where plan designs are
periodically reviewed and re-approved for participation in the exchanges.
In Connecticut, a committee within the Board helped design outlines of plans, including
what specific services were needed in each of the plans. For example, consumer advocates
argued heavily against having deductible payments apply to regular appointments. Deductibles
are a set amount the individual pays usually before the insurance company starts paying. For
example, the patient pays the first $1,000 before the insurance company starts chipping in. The
reason insurance companies like this is it drives down cost – people avoid unnecessary medical
care especially while they are still under the $1,000 amount. The fact that consumer advocates
made sure this deductible did not apply for routine visits means that a newly insured individual
will not have to pay the full expense of their first doctor visit – that is exempt from the
deductible. However, insurance companies are still covered in the event of a very expensive
emergency room bill – the customer pays the full deductible there. These plans were then sent to
insurance companies so they could sort out the specifics and pricing. The Connecticut Insurance
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Department (CID) reviews and approves changes in these plans by carriers (Kaiser Family
Foundation Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).

Negotiation with Insurance Companies
States have the option of having insurers submit bids to participate, or a general
negotiating strategy with insurers (Jost, 2010, 20). States can act as an active purchaser,
essentially managing the competition and negotiating product offerings with insurers. This
would entail a back-and-forth between the Board and insurers – almost bartering to find a
compromised system of pricing that works for affordability to consumers and profit to insurers.
Alternatively, the exchanges can be open marketplaces, or clearinghouses where all qualified
insurers are welcome to join. This model relies more on market forces to generate product
offerings (NCSL, 2014). States must consider the size of the exchange, the number of insurers,
and bargaining power when weighing these options.
California’s Exchange, for instance, acts as an active purchaser, selectively contracting
health coverage. Bids from insurers were evaluated based on their goals of affordability,
competition, alignment of delivery systems, and long-term partnerships (Kaiser Family
Foundation New York Marketplace Profile, 2013). Unlike California, Connecticut has operated
as a clearinghouse, accepting plans from all qualified insurance companies. No negotiating with
insurance companies took place. The plan skeleton designs went to carriers, and the carriers
filled in the details themselves. However, legislation has been passed that acknowledges that for
2015 and later the Exchange can opt to utilize a competitive bidding process and develop
selective contracting criteria (CT Health Plan Benefits & Qualifications Advisory Committee
Memo, 2012, 2).
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Concluding Remarks
This chapter discussed the paramount decisions states had to make while implementing
the exchanges of the ACA. If the coverage reforms are to serve their true purpose, the exchanges
are paramount to success. If the exchanges function as planned, they will expand coverage,
improve the quality of health insurance coverage and, eventually, reduce costs in the health care
sector. Determinants that seem small, such as the make-up of the board, or how they interact
with insurance companies, will make a difference in each state-designed exchange. The longterm effects of these decisions obviously have not reached fruition; however, it is possible at this
stage to look at a particular state and determine its initial successes and struggles with
implementation and tie these outcomes to specific decisions made by legislators and
policymakers that formed its pathway. Next, we turn to Connecticut to do just this.
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A Close-Up on Connecticut’s Access Health CT
“Connecticut is well-recognized as a national leader in effectively implementing the Affordable
Care Act, exceeding enrollment targets set by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget office by 136
percent and exceeding our own goals by 98 percent. This is success by any definition.”
– Connecticut Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman

In the media, Connecticut has been referred to as a national leader in implementing the
Affordable Care Act. Connecticut’s enrollment numbers validate that the state has reached a
large portion of the uninsured. In February of 2014, Connecticut was at 238% of its enrollment
target for the first four months. This put the state way ahead of all others. As of April 1, 2014,
Access Health CT has enrolled 208,301 residents in plans with private insurance carriers and
government-funded Medicaid (Access Health CT, 2014). The state has received praise from
many high-ranking federal officials. Other states are even approaching Connecticut to use its
proposed “exchange in a box,” which includes the technology and workflow processes that have
been significant in its success (Hickins, 2014). This chapter will rewind and establish why
Connecticut’s implementation has been portrayed as such a triumph. This will include an
overview of relevant Connecticut health reform history, reexamining structural decisions, and
analyzing enrollment data. Apart from a few glitches, Access Health CT is well deserving of the
praise it has received for its implementation so far. This chapter will outline factors that set
Connecticut apart from other states’ efforts and enabled success, like its established
infrastructure for health policy. Interviews with seven key players in Access Health CT’s
implementation also indicate a number of areas that could use improvement. These issues will
be explained, along with the potential impact they could have on Access Health CT’s future.

A Step Ahead: Past Health Reform Efforts Helped Set Connecticut Up For Success

41

Similar to Massachusetts, Connecticut advocates and legislators had been hard at work to
tackle the challenge of health care reform long before national legislation was passed. The
present success of Access Health CT can be attributed in part to the efforts of advocates and
public officials that had been working together on previous reform efforts. This experience
working on health reform and collaborating with one another created an infrastructure within the
health reform community, and these relationships were used to build an exchange structure that
would work.
Organizations and advocacy groups in Connecticut have fought for changes to the system
for decades. Before the ACA, state legislators in Connecticut had passed numerous health
reform bills, which helped establish solid foundations for the ACA. For example, Connecticut
had established solid Medicaid and Children’s Heath Insurance Program (CHIP) programs called
HUSKY. Membership in HUSKY is broken down into four categories, as Table 3 displays.
This structured system of Medicaid that was already in place made the expansion offered by the
ACA much easier to implement.

Table 3. Connecticut Children’s Health Insurance HUSKY Client Categories
HUSKY Type
HUSKY A
HUSKY B
HUSKY C

HUSKY D

Individuals Covered
Children, parents, and pregnant women
Children whose parents earn too much to
qualify for Medicaid
Disabled adults, low-income seniors,
individuals receiving long-term care
Covers adults who do nott have minor
children (this began in 2010 when
Connecticut became first state in country to
expand Medicaid under the ACA)

Source: CT Mirror 2013
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In addition to a solid existing Medicaid structure, Connecticut also had other health
reform proposals passed with help from organizations such as the Universal Health Care
Foundation of Connecticut. In collaboration with many groups across the state, the Foundation
built relationships with medical societies, hospitals, businesses, and labor groups to create a
proposal that would help provide affordable health coverage to 98% of Connecticut residents
(SustiNet Health Partnership, 2014). Public Act No. 09-148, An Act Concerning the
Establishment of the SustiNet Plan, was passed in 2009 and planned to have enrollment start in
July of 2012. While the reform was not a model for the ACA as Massachusetts’s reform was, it
still had a number of important similarities that aided Connecticut in getting a head start on
implementation. SustiNet looked to provide statewide health care plans for Connecticut
residents regardless of employment status, age, or pre-existing conditions (SustiNet Health
Partnership, 2014).
When the ACA was passed in March of 2010, the SustiNet Board was just getting
underway. Since many of the functionalities of SustiNet overlapped with those of the ACA,
efforts were shifted to Access Health CT. The SustiNet Board was asked to report to the General
Assembly in May of 2010 and advise how to implement the federal law in Connecticut. SustiNet
board Co-Chair Kevin Lembo said of the report, it “plots a course for our future conversations
and acknowledges the federal interaction in a solid way” (Stuart, 2014). The SustiNet Board of
Directors issued several repots to the Governor and General Assembly with a series of
recommendations for the ACA’s implementation. SustiNet’s structure and guidance were
imperative to gathering the right experts and advisers to help structure Access Health CT.
Legislators, advocates, and experts already had experience coming together on advisory
committees and knew how the processes of meetings went (SustiNet Health Partnership, 2011).
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The path to fight political battles to get health reform legislation through had been slightly worn
and the communication channels opened.1 In addition to having a solid foundation of
knowledgeable people within the state, Access Health CT also brought in new individuals with
valuable experience. For example, Access Health CT CEO Kevin Counihan served as the chief
marketing officer for the Massachusetts Health Insurance Connector Authority – which helped
Massachusetts in its health reform in 2006.

Set For Success: CT Has Earned Its Label as an ACA Implementation Leader
With solid experience of activism in health reform, Connecticut’s decision to establish its
own state-run exchange was the clear choice. In comparison with other states, Connecticut was
relatively successful in getting its exchange off the ground in part because of this head start. The
trials of the national healthcare.gov demonstrate the clear challenges of implementing an
exchange. When the ACA passed, DHHS did not think they would be running twenty-seven
exchanges and partnering to design seven. The burden of serving so many states with the federal
program meant a much more massive job than they anticipated, which resulted in catastrophe
when the healthcare.gov website was finally online for open enrollment. Chad Brooker, the
Director of Exchange Policy and Legal Advisor at Access Health CT, said, “Designing an
exchange for one state alone is a daunting task. I cannot fathom how the Department of Health
and Human Services is trying to organize designs and data processes with twenty-seven times the
amount of work we’re doing.” While the federal government and other states found themselves
on their heels in terms of implementing exchanges, Connecticut’s recent history of health care
reform and collaboration meant that the political will and capacity were in place for effective
1

As of September 2011, Connecticut Lieutenant Governor Nancy Wyman confirmed that SustiNet no longer
effectively exists as an active policy-making body, but rather as an information source to inform the decisions of the
Health Care Cabinet within the state (McQuaid, 2011).
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implementation. Connecticut’s jump on designing Access Health CT so quickly after the law
was passed made getting everything done within the short timelines given much easier. They
embraced the program, engaged their communities, and could focus on actively advertising for
the change (Scotti, 2013).
Connecticut’s political support also allowed it to be the first state to accept the ACA’s
expansion of Medicaid. Many states, particularly those with Republican-run politics, rejected
the expansion as a snub to the ACA in general. In these states, a large portion of the population,
those in the lowest-income bracket, were left without Medicaid as an option for health insurance.
Connecticut’s decision will allow a wider bracket of individuals to qualify for HUSKY, while
relieving state taxpayers of the cost of the expansion. Consumer advocates and Access Health
CT Board member Victoria Veltri have been vocal about the benefits this decision has had for
Connecticut: “It’s been a great change for coverage,” said Veltri. “We have a lot of people at
very low incomes in Connecticut. This has almost doubled the number of people inside the
program. Luckily – and I say this almost every day – we live in Connecticut, and we understand
the importance of covering our low-income population” (Campbell, 2012).
Some states, like Texas, do not even have a Board to help the federal government set up
their exchange. In contrast, Connecticut has an active Board of Directors with subcommittees
and advisory committees that meet at least bi-monthly. Advisory committees include consumer
experience and outreach, health plan benefits and qualifications, brokers, agents, and navigators,
and the small business health options programs “SHOP.” The quasi-governmental structure of
Access Health CT has allowed it to be efficient in decision-making.
The structure and organized nature of the Board also allowed it to be a strong leader
within the ACA implementation community on a national scale. Activists from Connecticut,
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such as small business advocate Kevin Galvin, have been resources for federal policymakers
since before the ACA was even passed. Galvin even participated at the Small Business
Financing Forum, a group called together by President Barack Obama to sketch out ideas and
strategies for health reform (Galvin, 2014). The importance of this is that many Connecticut
implementers were at the center of reforms from the beginning. They understood the changes,
and were innovators at the front of taking action to make the program work.
Their collective role as key actors from the outset also allowed Connecticut to be resilient
in fighting for implementation flexibility from the federal government. Peter Van Loon, Chief
Operating Operator of Access Health CT, believes that Connecticut’s ability to exercise a certain
level of “creative disobedience” was imperative to the success that it has had (Van Loon, 2014).
This “creative disobedience” included not following some orders from the federal government.
For example, drawing on the rich experience of its principals, Access Health CT realized early
on that it was not feasible for them to accommodate all of the Connecticut Medicare and
Medicaid Services’ regulations for the first few years of ACA implementation. They decided to
scale back the functionality of Access Health CT by twenty percent, and focus more effort on the
most important aspects of coverage for customers. “We wanted to build a Mercedes,” CEO
Kevin Counihan said. “But we’ve scaled back to a Ford Focus. And that has worked” (Pandey,
2014). Van Loon agrees, stressing that trying to cover all the directives from CMS would have
been disastrous, and that scaling back even more could ensure fuller, guaranteed functionality.

Outreach and Awareness: Navigator and Assistors in Connecticut
“The government is going to make you – mandate – that you buy insurance from an insurance
company or you pay a tax… That’s five swear words in one sentence.”
-Ellen Andrews, Executive Director of Connecticut Health Policy Project
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Experience with health care reform also allowed Connecticut policymakers to strategize
an effective outreach plan based upon what had worked or not worked in the past. In 2012,
Access Health CT started to gather input to help design and market the Exchange to its
customers. Many advocates were wary due to Connecticut’s mixed record with similar efforts.
In the early years of HUSKY, a lot of money was spent for outreach and awareness. However it
was not effective in attracting new applications or getting families covered (Connecticut Health
Policy Project, 2012). The CT Health Policy Project conducted focus groups with parents of
uninsured children that the program was trying to reach, and found that a big factor in parents
signing up for coverage was doing so through people that they trust, in formats they are used to.
Moreover, it was necessary that they hear the message several times. Recommended channels
were community organizations, schools, churches, and other trusted institutions.
Access Health CT listened. The current Navigator and Assistor Outreach Program is the
result of a unique partnership between Access Health CT and Connecticut’s Office of the
Healthcare Advocate (OHA), and has proven to play a key role in the Exchange’s community
outreach efforts (Eastern AHEC, Inc., 2014). Navigators and in-person assistors are
organizations and individuals who are in charge of helping to educate people about he new
system, understand their choices, and facilitate selection of a health insurance plan (Dash et al.,
2013, 7) Six organizations have been tapped in Connecticut as Navigator organizations, and the
state trained over 300 individuals to be Assisters. Training was thirty-four hours for assisters and
forty for navigators, and included passing a certification exam (Kaiser Family Foundation
Connecticut Marketplace Profile, 2013).
These people were the frontline workers, interacting with residents to make sure they
understand what the ACA can offer them, and ensuring they can make informed decisions
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regarding their health insurance coverage. Counihan said of the outreach program, “It’s a new
law and we have an obligation to explain it. A lot of things that have inhibited people from
buying insurance or that have made it too expensive will go away on January first. People need
to know about these benefits” (Gallo, 2014). Access Health CT was also the only state exchange
to open stores where residents of Connecticut could walk in and talk to trained individuals about
enrollment options. The stores were opened in cities with high concentrations of uninsured
people, such as New Britain and New Haven. They were inspired by Apple, Inc.’s famous
storefronts, with employees greeting people at the door and knowledgeable staff to explain the
process of signing up for health insurance. The effects of these stores were noteworthy; they
signed up, on average, 300 to 400 people per day (Gallo, 2014).

Looking to the Future: Problems that Could Threaten CT’s Success
The Hartford Business Journal sums up Access Health CT’s position accurately in one of
its recent headlines: “Exchange leaders deserve praise, but plenty of work remains” (Hartford
Business Journal Editorial, 2014). Comparably high enrollment numbers, impeccable project
management, and working technology were made possible by an infrastructure in the state that
offered insight into what they needed to accomplish. That is the good news. As implementation
continues in the days and months ahead, however, there are many unanswered questions and
future problems to solve.

Reaching the Remaining Uninsured
As a practical matter, if an uninsured individual was not reached through the first round
of outreach and open enrollment, new strategies must be employed to engage them. Access
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Health CT enrollment currently stands at 208,301 enrollees (Access Health CT, 2014). It is
unclear how many of the individuals signing up for coverage through the Exchange were
uninsured and how many switched from other insurance plans. However, uninsured totals for
Connecticut were approximately 344,582 in 2012 (CT Uninsured Profile Summary, 2012).
Thus, it is clear that there is a remaining group of individuals that have not signed up for
coverage.
Going forward, it is possible that Access Health CT will suffer the same problem that
Massachusetts did during its reform; namely, reaching that last group of uninsured that was not
brought into the system in round one. To address this challenge, the exchange should engage as
many stakeholders as possible, hold meetings and forums to share best practices and spread
innovative ideas, and target the message of signing up for insurance at crucial transitions when
people think of insurance, such as marriage, birth of a child, illness or death in the family
(Connecticut Health Policy Project, 2012).
As was the case in Massachusetts, reaching the Hispanic population in Connecticut has
proven to be challenging. Barriers this community faces include language, culture, financial
limitations, lack of access to the Internet, and fears of giving the federal government information
in the belief it could be used to deport family members (Radelat, 2014). The fact that
immigrants who lack permanent legal status are not allowed under the ACA to enroll through
any state insurance exchange contributes to confusion over eligibility. However, as Elena Rios,
president of the National Hispanic Health Foundation, points out, the problems Hispanics are
facing with ACA enrollment are nothing new. Most public programs face the same dilemma.
A similar approach to the one Massachusetts took will be necessary in Connecticut. In
order to pursue this strategy, Connecticut must identify which organizations and people are
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“trusted messengers” for hard-to-reach communities. An open back-and-forth between
organizations relating to constituents and policymakers, and a simple enrollment process will
help sign up more of the Hispanic population (Connecticut Health Policy Project, 2012).
Additionally, more work must be done on the Spanish-language Access Health CT website,
which launched in late February 2014 (almost five months after the English-language site went
up on October 1, 2013). Several Assistors in Connecticut have claimed that the website is
difficult to read, and they end up translating and interpreting the English-language website when
trying to help Latinos enroll (Radelat, 2014).

Potential Provider Shortages
Now that Access Health CT has signed up thousands of residents who have lacked
coverage, these people will be searching for primary care physicians. The Connecticut State
Medical Society is warning of a major shortage of physicians in the state that could lead to a lack
of access to doctors for the newly insured (Bordonaro, 2012). Dr. Douglas Gerard, an internist in
New Hartford, sees it as a simple supply and demand imbalance, “They are increasing the
demand side of patients, but didn’t increase the supply side of physicians.” As was the case in
Massachusetts, the fear for policymakers is that newly insured individuals will become frustrated
with an inability to find a provider. This frustration is dangerous because it has the potential to
expand to a “is coverage worth it for me” mentality.
Inaccuracy of carrier provider networks has the potential to compound this problem.
New enrollees receive a list from the insurance company that that includes all providers included
in the “covered network.” When they begin to call providers, however, they may be unable to
schedule an actual appointment. DSS commissioned a secret shopper survey of health plan
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networks in 2006 to verify Medicaid provider panels. People posing as HUSKY members called
the providers listed and were only able to secure needed appointments with one in four providers
listed in the plan directories (Andrews, 2013, slide twelve). This would be disastrous if the same
happened to people signing up for coverage through Access Health CT.
One suggested solution has been to allow nurse practitioners to treat patients and
prescribe medications independent of licensed physicians. A current proposal to the Connecticut
legislature by the Malloy administration would require APRNs to work with a physician for the
first three years after becoming licensed, but then would allow then to practice alone (Levin
Becker, 2014). Some argue that legislators should not reduce the training and education needed
to provide medical care. They worry that there has not been enough discussion about patient
safety issues. Supporters of the bill claim that APRNs in Connecticut are required to have a
graduate degree in nursing or a related field and certification from a national organization. They
claim nurse practitioners could be a solution to the potential problem of provider shortages in the
state.

Cost Containment
In addition to reaching the remaining uninsured and addressing provider shortages, cost is
still the elephant in the room for the implementation of health insurance exchanges. The United
States spends more of its gross domestic product (GDP) on health care than any other developed
democracy. In 2008, the United States spent more than $7,500 per capita on health care, which
was more than double what Germany spent and almost three times what New Zealand spent
(Orentlicher, 2011, 66). Just like Massachusetts’s health reform, the ACA focuses on expanding
access to coverage initially, and then defers cost containment to the following step. As a state
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with the fourth highest premiums for health insurance, cost is a looming problem that
Connecticut will face for a long time. First, there is the problem of health care service and goods
costs rising each year. On top of this, there is the fear that the new pool of insured residents
through Access Health CT will be adversely selected. If the newly insured are older and sicker
and incur most health care costs, it is not worth it for insurance companies because they are not
making as much money. Therefore, the response from insurance companies is to drive up prices
for everyone, both sick and healthy, to make sure their profit margin is where they want it to be.
This increase, combined with the natural increase in health care services and goods, make the
“affordable” part of the ACA seem less and less attainable.
With respect to adverse selection within the pool of consumers buying through Access
Health CT, information regarding the health status of individuals new to coverage will not be
available for months. Claims from those who started coverage in January of 2014 will not even
be available from carriers until May due to the lengthiness of the process. As such, risk-pool
assessments will not be available until a full year of coverage has been reviewed. Only then will
we know whether some degree of adverse selection has resulted in insurance companies needing
to raise costs moving forward.
Adverse selection will be an ongoing assessment for Access Health CT and exchanges
nationwide. With the enrollment period for many exchanges ending on March 31, 2014, the
numbers are only just coming out about the age of individuals signing up through exchanges.
The breakdown of numbers from the federal government is still not available. As discussed, the
fear with adverse selection is a “death spiral.” This would be a possibility if the enrollment of
individuals were skewed to older individuals with higher health costs, driving up costs from
insurance companies and making it unaffordable for many individuals (Universal Health CT,

52

2014). Table 4 demonstrates that the age distribution of members signing up for insurance
includes a large portion of enrollees, 30%, under the age of 35. While being younger does not
automatically equate to being healthier, the aggregate group of younger individuals are likely to
balance out the older and typically sicker people signing up for coverage.

Table 4. Connecticut’s Exchange Enrollment Data for October 1, 2013 – March 31, 2014
Total Enrolled CT Residents

208,301

Record in CT set on last day:

5,917 people signed up in one day

Enrolled with private insurance carriers

78,713

Enrolled in Medicaid:

129,588

Age Breakdown as of 3/27/2014

55 and older: 33%
45-54: 24%
Under 35: 30%

Source: Access Health CT Website

According to data from Access Health CT, the median age of individuals signing up
through the exchange is in the mid to upper 30s. More specific data will be released once the
last-minute enrollees have been tabulated; however, the data in Table 4 is promising in that the
age breakdown is not significantly skewed on the higher end. Additionally, a report issued by
the Kaiser Family Foundation (2014) suggests that fears about a “death spiral” should not be as
prominent as they are. Their study suggests that premiums are not as sensitive to the mix of
enrolled individuals as some people think, particularly with respect to age (Levitt, Glaxon &
Damico 2013).
Even if adverse selection is avoided, however, cost and affordability for consumers will
continue to be a struggle for Access Health CT. Two important suggestions for keeping costs
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down in Connecticut are stricter qualified health plans (QHPs) and active purchasing with
insurance companies. QHPs are plans that are approved for sale in state exchanges. Federal
guidelines have set criteria for QHPs to participate in an exchange, but states can decide to put in
place additional requirements. Alta Lash, Executive Director of United Connecticut Action for
Neighborhoods (UCAN), was on the eight-person Standard Plan Design Committee for Access
Health CT. The committee spent twenty-nine hours drafting plan designs as to what to include
in each tier of plans: bronze, silver, and gold. Lash, a consumer advocate, emphasized the
importance of getting only big health care costs – i.e. expensive emergency visits, surgeries – to
count towards a purchaser’s deductible (Lash, 2014). Additional victories for consumers
included ensuring complete coverage for preventative care, and flat fees for co-payments so
individuals know going into an appointment what they are expected to contribute for a particular
service. The plan designs went through a drafting period that included public comment and
editing states. Overall the plan designs themselves have not had too many objections. The real
issue that has been raised is how these skeleton designs are passed along to insurance carriers
who are then able to assign their own prices.
Access Health CT made the decision to not negotiate plan pricing with insurance
companies. The QHPs were sent out to participating carriers, who assigned prices and wrote up
the details of the bronze, silver, and gold plans they would offer through Access Health CT. The
language of the legislation passed for the Exchange does empower the Board to exercise active
purchasing: “the exchange is authorized and empowered to […] limit the number of plans
offered, and use selective criteria in determining which plans to offer, through the exchange,
provided individuals and employers have an adequate number and selection of choices” (SB921,
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Connecticut’s 2011 Health Insurance Exchange Act, 2011). There are two conflicting arguments
made by interest groups in Connecticut regarding active purchasing.
Consumer advocates insist that Access Health CT must negotiate on behalf of consumers.
To be clear, negotiation can take many forms, but the premise is that Access Health CT should
have a back-and-forth with insurance companies, bargaining with proposed costs from other
competitors, and have the power to say “that’s not good enough” if necessary. Proponents of
active purchasing compare Access Health CT to a large employer. Ninety percent of large
employers negotiate with insurers on behalf of their employees to maximize both value and
affordability (Andrews, 2012). Since Connecticut’s goal is between 250,000 and 300,000 state
residents, the idea is that the state can use this pool of potential consumers almost as if they were
a group of employees at a businesses shopping for health insurance. Consumers cite the decision
made by California’s exchange to exercise active purchasing, and also use Massachusetts’s
experience as well. In 2007, the MA Connector was not satisfied with premium bids offered by
carriers, so the Governor asked insurers to go back and “sharpen their pencils.” Advocates also
stress that Connecticut has been a leader in this reform, and although historically insurance
company interests have been kneeled to, now is the time for Access Health CT to step up. They
emphasize that federal regulations are meant to be a floor, not a ceiling for state exchange
standards (Andrews, 2012).
Others involved in implementation see active purchasing as unnecessary, and potentially
even detrimental to Connecticut’s marketplace. Although no formal comment or discussion has
been made of Access Health CT’s decision to not negotiate with insurance companies, Chad
Brooker, a policy analyst at Access Health CT, has said that active purchasing will not have the
effect that consumer advocates believe it will. The bargaining power of Access Health CT with

55

insurance companies is not great, even with a large pool of potential consumers, because so little
is known about the health and needs of that group. Many insurance companies already are not
participating on the Exchange yet, partially due to how little is known about the risks that these
businesses are taking. Because of this, Brooker emphasizes that negotiation would go a lot
differently in reality than many advocates dream (Brooker, 2014). Furthermore, Brooker points
to the naturally competitive nature of Access Health CT for insurance companies. If all
insurance companies are bargained down to the same price, the natural competitive forces are
driven out. Brooker pointed to Healthy CT, the non-profit carrier currently participating in
Access Health CT, as an example of the benefits of natural competition. Healthy CT only has
about 3% of signups in the state (Haigh, 2014). This abysmal number has been due to a number
of challenges, including lack of brand recognition and plans that were priced too high to compete
with other insurers. In response to this low sign-up percentage, Healthy CT will now be
incentivized to lower prices during the next enrollment cycle, which Brooker confirmed the
insurance company is already working on.
The battle of whether or not to active purchase could take a turn if a current bill in the
legislature, An Act Concerning the Duties of the Connecticut Health Insurance Exchange,
passes. This bill would direct Access Health CT to negotiate premiums with insurers on behalf
of consumers. A similar bill died on the state House of Representatives calendar last year.

Concluding Remarks
This chapter makes clear that Connecticut has earned its name as a leader in the
implementation of the ACA exchanges. The existing infrastructure for health reform allowed
Connecticut to have a quick jump on the ACA immediately after the law was passed, and even
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participate in recommendations to the federal government. This leadership role allowed them
some flexibility in implementation, which officials took advantage of by scaling back some
functionalities of Access Health CT for the first few years. These decisions streamlined
Connecticut’s focus and enabled implementers to do a comparatively smaller amount of work,
better. This included better outreach, better technology, and more manpower to double-check
and test-run.
While Connecticut has succeeded in comparison with other states, going forward, there
are changes that have to be made. In Massachusetts, the “learning organization,” the Connector,
had to make a number of changes throughout the years of implementation to improve the process
and overall health care sector. Connecticut faces some similar problems: in particular, reaching
the remaining uninsured and cost containment. To ensure that success continues, adaptations
will have to be made. Ideally, the strong infrastructure and political bandwidth that this state has
developed will continue to improve Access Health CT until all residents of Connecticut have
improved access to coverage and health care.
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Concluding Remarks: Where Do We Go From Here?
"The hallmark of health reform has been the concept of shared responsibility, the sense of shared
ownership of a common value that our nation benefits from more citizens realizing the peace of
mind of health insurance coverage. We must have the patience to recognize the implementation of
the ACA will take time to be fully realized.” –Kevin Counihan, CEO of Access Health CT

When the ACA was passed in 2010, Connecticut was poised for success much like
Massachusetts before its health reform in 2006. The state had a high uninsured rate at eight
percent, with the potential to sign up a lot of residents for coverage. Connecticut also had
political focus on the issue and a health reform infrastructure in place. The ACA was the big
sweeping reform backed by federal start-up funds that could make a positive change in health
care for Connecticut residents. The path this federal reform chose to take was modeled after
Massachusetts’s 2006 plan: get people quality, affordable health insurance first, then reduce the
costs of health care for individuals and the government. The hope was to have the DHHS guide
states through the process of building a health insurance exchange tailored to the demographics
and needs of each state.
Connecticut’s advantageous decision-making started with just that – designing its own
exchange and committing to implementation. The state has exceled in maintaining political
support, keeping focus on the issue, and selecting well when outsourcing for tasks such as
technology and outreach programs. Access Health CT signed up over 200,000 people for health
insurance in the first six-month enrollment period, or 30% of the eligible population in the state
(Access Health CT, 2014). Other consistently successful states throughout implementation
rollout are California and New York (John, 2014). Both of these states had health policy arenas
established in their states, and political support. On the other hand, Maryland is a state that had
political will for health reform and change, but struggled with technology and has floundered as
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a result. Frozen computer screens, error codes, and web site crashes plagued most of Maryland’s
first enrollment period. Meredith Cohn, a reporter in Maryland, spent two days – including two
calls to the exchange’s call center and seven repeats of entering her personal information –
buying insurance (Ornstein, 2014). This is an example of how all of the factors that came
together in Connecticut were like a recipe – without one and every one, success would not have
added up the way it did. While Maryland was projected to be a leader in ACA reform, the
Exchange failed in transparency during implementation and did not have a structure in place that
would encourage decisions-makers to assess problems and move to fix them. They did not have
same recipe as Connecticut.
Connecticut has over 7,000 non-profit organizations, many of which are devoted to
health-related concerns (Galvin, 2014). These organizations worked on past reform efforts – like
HUSKY and SustiNet – and helped Connecticut step up their game with respect to health
policies. Advocates, public engagers, leadership, experts – relationships between these groups
had been already through the health reform process and were ready to operate in a way that led to
successful ACA implementation. A key decision that arose from this infrastructure was the
“creative disobedience” of Connecticut policymakers. Cutting back and pushing timelines out
further than the federal government was asking was risky but necessary. Access Health CT’s
technology worked not only because the companies it contracted out to did their job, but also
because the task we handed over to them was smaller and more manageable. This was the recipe
– infrastructure, political support, and smart decisions – that allowed Connecticut to be
commended for early implementation success.
While Connecticut should celebrate these early implementation victories, several
potentially debilitating problems have arisen that threaten Connecticut’s success. The experience
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of Massachusetts warns us that cost containment, provider shortages, and difficulty reaching
certain populations, are likely to persist as struggles for implementation efforts. Initial
implementation efforts in Connecticut suggest the same will likely be true in our state.
Consumer advocates still worry about the affordability of health insurance plans for consumers.
Insurance companies are still assessing whether there is significant adverse selection within
Access Health CT’s participants, which could drive up insurance costs for all residents. All of
this swirls around the steady increase in health care services and goods costs. Pair these
increases with the high expectation of provider shortages in the state, and it seems surprising that
policymakers in the state are still optimistic about the future of Access Health CT.
But there is a reason they are optimistic. Steps can be taken to combat these problems.
Some have already been put into motion. Bills awaiting legislative action include one that
requires Access Health CT to directly negotiate with health insurance companies over premium
rates. Another measure proposes using a State Innovation Model (SIM) planning grant of $2.8
million from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to promote
affordability, value, and eliminate inequities in health care. This plan was submitted and
accepted by CMS at the end of 2013 and it encompasses a variety of changes to create a more
sustainable health care system. Unlike the ACA, this reform focuses more on improving the
provider and care side of public health, rather than insurance coverage and access. The plan
includes measures such as requiring electronic health records, focus on preventative care, and
arming consumers with the tools they need to make health decisions. The specifics of
implementation are still in the works as of April 2014, but this ambitious vision for change looks
promising (Universal Health Care Foundation of Connecticut, 2013). If successful, this could
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help mitigate the cost concerns of Access Health CT’s future insurance plans by keeping the
prices of health care services and goods down.
An additional proposal from the Malloy administration would allow advanced practice
registered nurses (APRNs) to work independently of doctors would change the medical
landscape in Connecticut and expand access to primary care for citizens. The National
Governors Association stated, “expanded utilization of [APRNs] has the potential to increase
access to health care, particularly in historically underserved areas” (NGA, 2012). At the time of
writing, this bill has passed the Senate and House of Representatives and is moving to Governor
Malloy’s desk, which he has publicly stated that he will sign. This is a positive indication that
Connecticut policymakers are willing to adapt at least some changes needed to aid ACA’s
implementation.
The content of these proposed adjustments to exchange implementation are important;
however, it is of equal importance that Connecticut will continue to benefit from the general
willingness of Connecticut politicians and advocates to fight for something better. Throughout
this thesis process, I have met individuals that would fight each other tooth and nail over health
care reform decisions. But all were passionate and dedicated to their efforts to make change. In
2002, Gary Rose wrote that Connecticut politics has a reputation as the “land of steady habits”
and “the Constitution State,” due to its predictable and stable system of politics, as well as its
long tradition of noble self-government. This predictability includes a stark party division in the
legislature. Even so, Connecticut is a small state. Legislators, advocates, representatives of
different industries and organizations know each other and many have worked together for
decades. This existing infrastructure that helped Connecticut with its initial success in exchange
implementation will be key for making key adaptations throughout the rest of Access Health
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CT’s implementation. Building on the existing reform infrastructure and the advocacy networks,
Connecticut needs to be able to respond to implementation challenges as a “learning
organization,” in ways similar to the Massachusetts model. As long as we acknowledge when
problems arise and utilize the infrastructure we have to solve that problem, we can make the best
of the ACA work for our state and increase both the quality and affordability of health insurance
for residents. Connecticut should continue to be a leader in ACA implementation, but must
settle in for the long road ahead.
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